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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - COMMITMENT AFTER ACQUITTAL ON
GROUND OF INSANITY- RELEASE OR DISCHARGE
Relator, who had been automatically committed to a state
mental institution after his acquittal of a capital crime by rea-
son of insanity, petitioned the district court which had ordered
his commitment for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
he was no longer insane.1 On appeal from a dismissal of the
petition the Third Circuit Court of Appeal refused to review.
Held, since relator's commitment resulted from a criminal pro-
ceeding against him, a petition for habeas corpus was a crim-
inal rather than a civil matter which the court of appeal, having
no criminal appellate jurisdiction, could not review. Further, as
no sentence had been imposed, the Louisiana Supreme Court also
lacked criminal appellate jurisdiction, thereby requiring that the
appeal be dismissed rather than transferred. State ex rel. Bal-
tett v. Gremillion, 168 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writ
refused, 169 So. 2d 393 (La. 1965).2
The criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Louisiana Supreme
Court is limited to cases in which the penalty of death or im-
prisonment at hard labor may be imposed or in which a fine
exceeding three hundred dollars or a sentence exceeding six
months imprisonment has actually been imposed.3 The Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
in criminal cases within its appellate jurisdiction, but it lacks
appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings in all crim-
inal cases.4 Consequently, a court's ruling in such a habeas cor-
pus proceeding is reviewable by the Supreme Court only under
1. LA. R.S. 15:270 (1950) : "Any person charged with an offense for which
the penalty is or may be capital punishment who, upon trial, is found not guilty
by reason of insanity or mental defect shall be committed by the judge to a state
mental institution. No person so committed shall be released from the state
mental institution except upon the order of the same court which ordered his
commitment based upon a determination that such person no longer is criminally
insane or a menace to society."
2. In denying writs, the Supreme Court said: "The showing made does not
warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction." 169 So. 2d 392 (La. 1965)
(two Justices dissenting).
3. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(7).
4. Id. art. VII, §§ 2, 10; State em rel. Cox v. Clemmons, 243 La. 264, 142
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its supervisory powers.5 On the other hand, an appeal to the
Supreme Court will lie from a habeas corpus proceeding involv-
ing a civil matter.6 The courts of appeal lack criminal appellate
jurisdiction in all cases except appeals from criminal prosecu-
tions against juveniles.7 Since courts of appeal have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only where they
have appellate jurisdiction, they cannot issue writs of habeas
corpus in criminal cases," and, for the same reason, cannot en-
tertain appeals from such habeas corpus proceedings. 9 Similar-
ly, their supervisory jurisdiction is limited to cases in which an
appeal would lie. 10 An appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding
involving a civil matter, however, will lie to a court of appeal as
well as to the Supreme Court." The controlling factor in the
availability of appeal, therefore, is whether the habeas corpus
proceeding involved a criminal or a civil matter; if the former,
no appeal will lie to either a court of appeal or to the Supreme
Court.
Louisiana R.S. 15:270 provides for automatic commitment of
a person acquitted of a capital crime by reason of insanity.12
Louisiana R.S. 28:59, in turn, provides that a person acquitted
of a non-capital crime by reason of insanity may be committed
"in the same manner provided in R.S. 28:53" of the general men-
tal health law. 1 Judicial commitment under R.S. 28:53 has been
repeatedly held to be a civil exercise of the state's police power
and not a criminal proceeding or a formal interdiction proceed-
ing.14 Consequently, a petition for discharge from such a civil
So. 2d 794 (1962) ; State ex rel. Mclsaac v. Sigler, 236 La. 773, 109 So. 2d 89
(1959) ; State ex rel. Womack v. Walker, 236 La. 129, 107 So. 2d 417 (1958) ;
State v. Lacrouts, 134 La. 900, 64 So. 824 (1914) ; Ex parte Mitchell, 1 La. Ann.
413 (1846).
5. State ex rel. Cox v. Clemmons, 243 La. 264, 142 So. 2d 794 (1962) ; State
em rel. Womack v. Walker, 236 La. 129, 107 So. 2d 417 (1958).
6. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10; State en rel. Womack v. Walker, 236 La. 129,
107 So. 2d 417 (1958).
7. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 29.
8. In re Ingram, 82 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
9. Ibid.
10. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 29.
11. Ibid.; In re Ingram, 82 So.2d 788 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
12. See note 1 supra.
13. LA. R.S. 28:53 (Supp. 1964): "A. Upon application by any responsible
person, accompanied by a certificate as provided in R.S. 28:52, the judge of
the civil district court may commit to an institution any patient within his juris-
diction when, in his opinion, commitment is in the best interest of the patient and,
the community. The court shall fix a date for a hearing to be held not less than
five days from receipt of examiner's report."
14. See In re Ingram, 82 So. 2d 788, 790 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955), and
authorities cited therein.
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commitment under R.S. 28:53 would be a civil proceeding and a
refusal to order a discharge would be appealable to the proper
court of appeal.15
In the instant case the court of appeal held in effect that
automatic commitment of a person acquitted of a capital crime
by reason of insanity was a criminal proceeding and that a pro-
ceeding seeking discharge from such commitment would not be
appealable to the court of appeal because it lacked the requisite
criminal appellate jurisdiction. Counsel for relator strongly
argued that his commitment should be regarded as a civil mat-
ter, since he was found not guilty of any crime. The court re-
jected this contention relying largely on official comments to
the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that where a person
"was confined as a result of a criminal proceeding against him,"
his confinement was a criminal matter. 6 This decision leads to
the conclusion that the commitment of a person acquitted of a
capital crime by reason of insanity is a criminal proceeding,
whereas the commitment of a person acquitted of a non-capital
crime is a civil proceeding. Such a distinction would seem sup-
portable under the court's rationale only if the commitment of
a person acquitted of a non-capital crime did not occur "as a re-
sult of a criminal proceeding against him." In both the capital
and non-capital cases the commitment, whether automatic or
after a hearing, arises out of the acquittal on the ground of in-
sanity. Significantly, in the non-capital case the court of acquit-
tal, rather than a civil district court, handles the commitment
proceedings and the prosecuting attorney is the "responsible
person" who files the application for commitment.17 In addition,
because the defendant has successfully claimed insanity to es-
cape criminal responsibility he is presumed still insane and he
15. A person seeking discharge from a civil commitment may use the civil
habeas corpus provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. See LA. CODE OF CIvIL
PROCEDURE bk. 7, tit. 3, ch. 2, Preliminary Statement 595 (1960) : "After a
careful study of the practices in other states, it was determined that this Code
should include articles regulating the use of the writ of habeas corpus in civil
proceedings, such as cases involving custody of children or civil commitment."
(Emphasis added.)
16. Ibid. "The articles in the Code of Criminal Procedure regulate the use of
the writ [of habeas corpus] where the applicant is confined as a result of a
criminal proceeding against him."
17. Compare LA. R.S. 28:59 (1950), quoted in this note, with id. 28:53
(Supp. 1964), quoted in note 13 supra. R.S. 28:59 provides: "Any person
acquitted of a crime or misdemeanor by reason of insanity or mental defect may
be committed to the proper institution in the manner provided in R.S. 28:53,
28:54, and 28:55, by the district court of acquittal and contradictorily with the
district attorney."
19651
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
must rebut this presumption to avoid commitment. 18 All of these
factors seem to indicate that although the person acquitted of a
non-capital crime by reason of insanity may be subject to sub-
sequent civil commitment, such a commitment nonetheless fol-
lows "as a result of a criminal proceeding against him."
In State v. Hebertl9;the defendant, charged with forgery, ap-
pealed from the judgment of the district court declaring him
presently insane and unable to stand trial. Over objections by
the state the Supreme Court held that it had appellate jurisdic-
tion over this proceeding because it was a final and prejudicial
judgment. The court also stated that "a proceeding of this kind
is not a 'criminal case,' but is a proceeding which grows out of
and is incidental to a criminal case."' 20 Surely here is an instance
where a person was "confined as a result of a criminal proceed-
ing against him" and yet the Supreme Court clearly stated that
such a proceeding was not a "criminal case." It seems necessary
to conclude, therefore, that the court in the instant case was
erroneous in holding that the "confinement of a person as a re-
sult of a criminal proceeding against him" is necessarily a crim-
inal matter. It is submitted that relator's commitment was not
a "criminal case" but rather a "proceeding which grows out of
and is incidental to a criminal case," and that the court of appeal
in the instant case therefore had civil appellate jurisdiction.21
Assuming, arguendo, that the court was correct in holding
that the instant case was a criminal matter, appellate review
seems unavailable in such a case. The court of appeal indicated
that the Supreme Court could not entertain an appeal in the
18. For a proposed statutory recognition of this presumption see LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVISION, EXPOSt DES
MOTIFS no. 19, tit. XXI- Insanity Proceedings art. 14 (March 8, 1963) : "When
a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity in any other felony case,
the court shall remand him to the parish jail and shall hold a prompt contra-
dictory hearing, at which the defendant shall have the burden of proof, to deter-
mine whether the defendant may be discharged without danger to others or to
himself." (Emphasis added.)
19. 187 La. 318, 174 So. 369 (1937).
20. Id. at 324, 174 So. at 371; see also State v. Yaun, 235 La. 105, 102 So. 2d
862 (1958), citing the Hebert opinion with approval.
21. Various other jurisdictions having statutes requiring commitment after
acquittal by reason of insanity and similar discharge or release provisions hold
that commitment and discharge proceedings are civil matters. See, e.g., Bailey v.
State, 210. Ga. 52, 77 S.E.2d 511 (1953) (automatic commitment following
acquittal by reason of insanity is not a judgment or sentence but merely an act
pursuant to police power); State ex rel. Boeldt v. Criminal Ct., 236 Ind. 290,
139 N.E.2d 891 (1957) (application for discharge from commitment following
acquittal by reason of insanity is not ancillary to criminal proceedings in which
applicant had been committed, but is a new and separate action). .... :.
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instant case, because this type of case did not fall within the
Supreme Court's criminal appellate jurisdiction, and, therefore,
relator's. only remedy was to seek supervisory writs from the
Supreme Court. Although it seems evident that no appeal would
lie from the denial of the writ of. habeas corpus, this is not neces-
sarily due to a lack of criminal appellate jurisdiction. The Su-
preme Court has said that a judgment denying a writ of habeas
corpus in any criminal case is not appealable even though the
Supreme Court might otherwise have criminal appellate juris-
diction.2 2 If the. Supreme Court had in fact criminal appellate
jurisdiction in the instant case, relator could seemingly apply
for a new writ of habeas corpus to the high court, even though
he could not appeal from the denial of the former writ, under
the reasoning of the Hebert case. If such a proceeding before
the Supreme Court is regarded as criminal despite the clear lan-
guage of the Supreme Court to the contrary, then here is a sit-
uation where the high court recognized its appellate jurisdiction
in a criminal matter even though no sentence had been imposed.
As the court said, the judgment finally disposed of the case and
was prejudicial because it deprived the party of his liberty. The
same factors exist in the instant case. Accordingly, should the
proceedings against relator be regarded as criminal, the Su-
preme Court would still have appellate jurisdiction, and could
thus issue a writ of habeas corpus.
In addition to the problem of appellate review, the instant
case reflects the need for a more definite standard and proce-
dure for the release or discharge of persons committed as a re-
sult of acquittal. The present law simply provides that no per-
son shall be released except by order of the court which commit-
ted him and only "upon a determination that such person no
longer is criminally insane or a menace to society. '23 The phy-
sicians in the instant case testified that relator was not crim-
inally insane. The district court refused to order his release,
however, because of evidence that he may be potentially a men-
ace-to society. One of the dissenting Justices stated that if "men-
ace to society" were thus construed, it was unconstitutional.2'
The practical effect of such a construction is to render discharge
Virtually impossible. State courts in certain common law juris-
dictions, as well as some federal courts, when confronted with
22. See note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
23. LA. R.S. 15:270 (1950), quoted note 1 supra.
24. See 169 So. 2d 392 (La. 1964) (dissenting from refusal to grant'writs).
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similar discharge provisions, have construed them to require a
more definite standard.2 In Louisiana under the earlier com-
mitment and release provisions, now repealed,2 6 any person
acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity was automatically
committed to the ward for the criminally insane. Whenever
such a person alleged he had regained his reason, however, a
rule to show cause why he should not be released would be taken
and tried contradictorily with the district attorney of the parish
from which he had been committed with a jury verdict deciding
the issue. Under the present general mental health law a person
committed by court order may be discharged "if by reason of
his cure and in the best interest of the patient and the public,
discharge is proper. '27 This discharge can come only after the
superintendent or the director of the department has been given
notice of the application and an opportunity to be heard. Recent
legislation has been enacted to require annual examination of
persons committed to a mental institution because of incapacity
to stand trial.28 Although this legislation is inapplicable to a
person committed after acquittal by reason of insanity, it is a
step in the right direction towards helping the "forgotten man"
of. the mental hospital.
The proposed revision to the Code of Criminal Procedure con-
tains needed provisions for the discharge or release on probation
of a person committed to a mental institution after his acquittal
by reason of insanity. 29 Under this revision either the superin-
tendent of the institution or the committed person himself may
apply for discharge or release on probation to the court which
committed him. 0 Additional examining physicians may be used
by this court as well as by the committed person and the district
attorney,5 1 and the committed person may be discharged or re-
leased on probation if, after considering all the reports, the
25. See, e.g., Olverholder v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (mere
fact that committed person has some dangerous propensity does not alone war-
rant his continued confinement) ; State ex rel. Barnes v. Behan, 124 N.W.2d 179
(S.D. 1963) (must be reasonable probability that because of unsound mind com-
mitted person is dangerous to himself or society).
26. La. Acts 1928, No. 2, § 1, repealed by La. Acts 1932, No. 136, § 2.
27. LA. R.S. 28:98 (1950).
28. Id. 15:271 (Supp. 1964) ; see The Work of the Louisiana Legislature of
1964 - Criminal Procedure, 25 LA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1964).
29. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVISION, ExPost DES MOTIFS No. 19, tit. XXI - Insanity Proceedings arts. 14-17
(March 8, 1963).
30. Id. art. 15.
.31. Id. art. 16.
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-court is satisfied that his discharge or release will be "without
danger to others or to himself. '3 2 If the court is not so satisfied
it may. hold a contradictory hearing on the matter.3 3 This pro-
posed legislation seems at least to furnish the committed person
:a better opportunity for discharge or release on probation, by
-allowing adequate cognizance to be taken of medical opinion.
However, the suggested standard, "danger to others or to him-
self," may easily be open to the same criticism voiced against
"menace to society," if it is construed to mean a mere potential
-danger. Whether this proposed legislation would be construed
as a criminal rather than a civil matter remains to be seen. 4
It is submitted that additional legislation might be advisable
to insure appellate review. In any event, it is hoped that if the
result of the instant case is followed, the Supreme Court's super-
visory powers will be construed more liberally to insure that
such a committed person is afforded a fair opportunity to be
heard and is not incarcerated for life because of a mere pos-
sibility that he will be a menace to society.
Paul H. Dug_
FEDERAL COURTS - CHANGE OF VENUE UNDER SECTION 1404 (a)
- CONSIDERATION OF APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW.
"IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE"
Section 1404 (a) of the Judicial Code' authorizes a federal
district court to transfer a civil action to any other district
where it might have been brought 2 upon the showing that the
32. Id. art. 17.
33. Ibid.
34. Note that article 17 of the proposed revision on Insanity Proceedings,
although based on section 4.08(3) of the ALI Model Penal Code, deleted the
provision that "any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceding." See note 29
supra.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958): "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought." See generally
Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial
Code, 10 F.R.D. 595 (1950).
2. The Court in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960) construed the
words "where it might have been brought" to mean that the plaintiff must have
had an unqualified right to bring the action in the proposed transferee court in-
dependent of the consent of the defendant. See generally 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.145[6] (2d ed. 1964). The Court seems to have retreated somewhat
from this position. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) noted 42
TzxAs L. REv. 1085, 1086 (1964).
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